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(FOUO 10/79)

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7 February 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 10/79)

WEST

EUROPE

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FRANCE

SAKHAROV: RIGHTS MOVEMENT CANNOT BE DESTROYED DESPITE GROWING REPRESSION

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 27 Jan 79 p 41 LD

[Michel Gordey written interview on 25 December 1978 with Soviet dissident Andrey Sakharov: "Replies to Michel Gordey's Written Questions"]

[Text] [Question] Last summer a group of dissidents now living in the West published a statement claiming that the Soviet leadership has decided to liquidate the movement for the defense of human rights both inside the country and abroad. Are you aware of such a decision?

[Answer] I know nothing of any decision of this kind. However, the years 1977-1978 brought a new wave of severe repression, chiefly in Moscow and the capitals of certain republics (in the provinces the level of dissident repression is virtually absolute). Many known activists in the struggle for human rights were arrested and sentenced; the persecution of religious groups not dependent on the authorities intensified.

The arrest and forthcoming trial of 83-year old Vladimir Chelkov, spiritual leader of the Seventh Day Adventists, is a tragic example. The extremely harsh sentences meted out to members of the Helsinki group (Orlov, Ginzburg, Shcharanskiy, Lukyanenko, Tikhii, Pyatkus, Rudenko, Kostava and others), the verdicts against Ida Nudel, Slepaka had begun, the persecution of people who ask to leave the USSR, the heightened repression against Crimean Tatars--houses bulldozed, hundreds of families reduced to a tragic situation--all these things arouse deep anxiety and sorrow and call for active intervention by world public opinion. The mounting repression still continues today: Zissels, Kukabakiy, Buzinnikov and Ogorodnikov have been arrested, houses have been searched in Moscow and Riga.

[Question] How do you assess your own situation at the present time?

[Answer] I see this period, which began with my being summoned by the deputy Soviet prosecutor in January 1977, as representing an undeniable escalation in persecution. We are particularly affected by the total blockade on telephone and postal communications with the West and even any personal

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contact with our children who have been forced to go into exile in the West. Letters do not arrive, and telephone conversations are interrupted at any hour of the day or night, whoever the caller.

- The secret search carried out in our home on 29 November marked a new step in persecution. That day we left our apartment for 1 hour 30 minutes (usually we avoided all going out together at the same time). On our return we noticed that numerous documents had been stolen, even though the apartment was locked.

[Question] In conclusion, I would like to hear your opinion about the prospects for the human rights defense movement in your country.

- [Answer] However painful the fate of militants for the defense of human rights in the USSR and Eastern Europe, I am convinced that the movement has reached a degree of maturity such that the government is powerless to destroy it and eliminate the results of its activities, which have a universal character. No one has the power to neutralize the impartial and accurate information about human rights violations which is today disseminated throughout the world. No one can denigrate the ideology of defending human rights, which is at the heart of public opinion movements in many countries and also the basis of documents of major importance. No one has power over the free choice of new combatants, who will not fail to embark on this hard path as long as human rights violations continue.

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FRANCE

ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS TO MULTINATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 9 Jan 79 pp 38,39

[Interview with economist Jacques Delors conducted by Alain Jacques and Michel Bosquet, Paris, date not given]

[Text] The explanation most commonly heard for the ever-faster worsening of the crisis besetting the steel industry, ship-building, and textile industries is "the new international division of labor": some very young countries, where low wages are the rule, are in a position to handle this kind of production much more cheaply than we can. That being the case, there is nothing for it but for us to shut down our plants. That was part of a recent statement by German Finance Minister Hans Matthöfer (SDP): "Because our wages and our social costs are high, we shall never again be a major producer of steel textiles, or ships." Along the same lines, L'EXPANSION wrote: "Today, Tunisia makes our trousers and Japan builds out ships. Tomorrow, Korea will be building our cars, Iran will be providing our ethylene, and Brazil will be mining our aluminum.... The industrialized nations are wearing themselves out trying to prolong the vegetative lives of industries that have no future. Industrial redeployment must be France's number-one concern." The French government is in complete agreement with that view. But the dying industries used to employ a lot of manpower, while those a-borning require very little. Hence this idea from the classical economists: the only areas in which new jobs can be created are those which, sheltered against all foreign competition, produce exclusively for the foreign market and hence do not weigh either upon the selling prices of exporting industries nor on the "cost of living." Such "protected activities" are thus primarily services and, what is more important, services which are not of vital importance either to individuals or to society as a whole. We asked economist Jacques Delors for his opinion on this issue.

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Question: What do you think of this analysis? Do you see any other way out than that of "two sectors" -- one producing solely for export, the other for domestic consumption -- or, as it is generally expressed in today's "Franglais," the "économie duale"?

Jacques Delors: There has always been dualism in our economies: some enterprises exposed to international competition and others sheltered from it; big enterprises and small ones; goods and services sold on the market and services which are not for sale: all these are lines of cleavage we shall continue to have with us. The globalization of the economy does change the dimensions of the problem, true enough, but not enough to lead us into unwarranted simplification. Let's not surrender, either to defeatism ("we can no longer produce this or that kind of goods") or to Malthusianism (growth is all behind us now"). There are still so many needs to be satisfied, there are still so many possibilities unexplored or unexploited in the areas of science and technology, and so many social innovations yet to be born.

It is in this spirit that I should like to answer your question, without underestimating the scope of the challenges that face us.

We must, in fact, start thinking about still more complex economic structures. Contrary to the current philosophy of the President and the Prime Minister, I don't think we have to surrender to the international market alone the right to make decisions as to what we must produce in France. We do not have to wipe out whole sectors of our industry on the pretext that other countries' products are cheaper on that market than ours.

After all, traditions, study bureaus, professional skills -- all of these count for something, too, and are worth our while to preserve, at least in part. The moment you start thinking in terms of products rather than in terms of sectors, you discover that France can perfectly well go on making and exporting certain types of shoes, textiles, leather products, etc. And that it can even develop, within these same sectors, products of a new kind, based on technologies very different from those used in the past. Furthermore, the hallmark of old-style growth was standardization of goods, maximization of profits, Taylorism, and intensive urbanization. Today, though, we have technologies that make it possible to produce more personalized goods and services, in small, decentralized units, with a technology that is the opposite of Taylorism, which makes the product better and the job more worth the doing.

Of course there will always be a concentrated sector of big factories turning out mass-produced goods. But that is not the only possible way to go. Technology has become a sought-for stake in politics because it opens the door to other possible options. And we must insist on this point: it is no longer true,

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though people even now will go on saying it is, that centralized mass production is in every case more profitable and more efficient. Quite the contrary: in a steadily growing number of domains, small units can achieve just as high if not higher levels of efficiency as can concentrated production. Small units will in fact stand to gain by means of shared computer facilities and minicomputers; but you have to take note as well of the fact that decentralization, in and of itself, brings with it savings and economic advantages. It lets you adjust your products better to local needs; it cuts down transport time and costs; it lets you make use of local energy sources which can be most advantageous (small waterfalls, wind, sun, etc.) and which are currently being neglected or overlooked.

Decentralization, worker management, bringing the locations of production, consumption, and habitation closer together; setting up very-high-performance enterprises in semi-urban, semi-rural areas -- these goals are not mere flights of fancy, but hard possibilities offered us by technological progress.

Question: You think that this might result not only in more jobs, but also in a more even distribution of work across the population? And also a more flexible organization of labor and working hours, a greater diversity of jobs available to everyone?

Jacques Delors: Yes, I do, and a major reduction in the work-week, as well. In the old pattern of growth, progress in productivity was distributed at the rate of 80 percent in the form of goods and services, and only 20 percent in the form of leisure time. The new growth pattern will let us change that ratio little by little. Cuts in hours on the job can come about in various ways, tailored to very different motivations: some people will look for very rewarding work, in which they can invest more of themselves; others will prefer a routine, automatic job that will let them think about something else or to talk with their neighbor; a great many would like to switch from one kind of work to another, to work part-time, to get off work earlier in the afternoon, to be able to take long sabbaticals to continue their education.

This would make us free to manage our own time, and we can devise a formula which would let everyone between the ages of 18 and 65 to manage his own time -- making due allowance for the constraints of production -- on and off the job, dividing it as he or she likes between work time and non-work time (training and education, other activities, leisure, rest...). On condition, of course, that over the course of his lifetime he puts in a given number of hours of work, he would be provided with replacement income during periods away from work.

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Under such a system, every young French citizen would have the right, starting at age 16, to 6 years of study. Some would use it all up directly; others would go to work first and then come back, at this or that point in their lives, to study whatever interested them, perhaps something that had nothing to do with their jobs: go into music or painting, or help restore the environment, or, if they would rather, set up their own plumbing shop or start community services for their neighborhood.

The time policy implies a policy for society, and vice versa. And it is obvious that shortening the work-day would gradually give rise to new needs and to a desire to live differently; to make things, for example, which we now buy readymade; to have access to a more extensive range of collective assets, of cultural opportunities, and the like. A whole new social dynamic, leading into a different pattern of development, would thus be set in motion.

I think that when this happens, the work/leisure dichotomy will tend to blur, and will give way to the obligatory work/voluntary activity/leisure and rest triad.

Question: It's these voluntary activities you mean when you refer to the "third sector"?

Jacques Delors: Not exactly. What I mean is, among other things, activities by which people, on their own initiative, create non-commercial goods and services to meet needs that are unfilled or even unknown.

Let's take first of all the example of a building in which the families get together and decide to provide the services they need: day nursery, pre-school, kindergarten. They will provide these services themselves, taking turns at helping each other, and these services will no longer be provided in exchange for money payments. They will be recreating spaces sheltered from the prevalence of commercialism which, in the capitalist system, gradually destroys the domains of the gratuitous and of interpersonal services. It is altogether possible that local communities would take an interest in such endeavors and subsidize them to get them started.

One could also envisage -- and this is another form the third sector might take -- five individuals' getting together to offer the families of a neighborhood or a commune day nursery, pre-school, kindergarten, or home services for which there seems to be a need. Insofar as this would be a semi-free service, it might be covered by a contract between the group whose idea it was and the local collectivity which would assure part of its financial backing.

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All the experiments we have already made go to show that a service born of initiative from below will cost less and turn out to be far better suited to the needs of the population than will big institutions or bureaucracies. As a matter of fact, the way the latter operate is, by its very nature, ill-adapted to individual cases, to local circumstances, and to the specific problems stemming from poverty or from social marginality.

There would be no question, in my view, of going back to the old ways in the areas of policy toward health, childhood, old age, and the like. I want that to be clear. On the contrary, what we must do is to complement, to round out, to uncorset and to enrich the things the traditional agencies can do, and to let men and women themselves have a say in handling the problems of their lives.

This is yet another illustration of what I believe is one of the keys for avoiding depersonalization: to respond to the longing for independence and autonomy through the development of manifold practical forms which the worker-management utopia might take.

One more thing, though: this "third sector" is not confined to non-commercial services. It may also extend to take in the production of personalized goods, or such tasks as maintenance and repairs. There will be no real chances for self-development unless, first of all, profound political change has made it possible to turn the very logic of the economy upside-down. Otherwise, capitalism, with profit as its sole motivation, will leave the third sector only crumbs. In actual fact, the underlying rule of the dominant system is: privatize your profits, socialize your losses. In that context, the third sector would play only a social welfare role, and its innovations would very quickly be snatched away or marginalized.

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ITALY

1978 CALLED 'GOOD YEAR' FOR SELENIA FIRM

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 6 Jan 79 p 30

[Article by Jean de Galard]

[Text] Throughout the year 1978 we have mentioned in the columns of AIR & COSMOS, whenever the occasion arose, essential facts making the activities of the various departments of the Italian Selenia firm: radars and civil systems, naval systems, radars and missiles, and space, whether it was a matter of orders, project start-ups, missile firings, or launching of satellites in whose construction the Italian manufacturer participated.

It appears, at the time for annual statements, that the one for 1978 of Selenia will be highly positive. This will be underscored by this review of the year which we have formulated for the four activity sectors above cited.

Let us recall that Selenia is one of the principal members of the STET-IRA (Societa Finanziaria Telefonica per Azioni--Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale) group, that its capitalization of 17.5 billion lire (90 million francs) is divided as follows: STET 70.23 percent, Finmeccanica 25.34 percent, IRI 2.54 percent, and FIAT 1.89 percent, and that its principal centers of activity and production are in Rome, Jusaro, Pomezia, and Giuliano, near Naples, where a production plant was recently opened. Selenia's exports represent 75 percent of its total activity. The company employs 6,000 persons, of whom 2,300 are engineers.

In the domain of radars and civil systems the company continued its world-wide expansion in 1978 (122 air traffic control systems installed in 23 countries) with the execution of three large contracts in particular: with Hungary to provide, and place into operation, an ATCR-33 radar of medium power, operating in band 5, and equipped with a G-33 antenna of new type; with Sweden, to modernize an ATCR-21 system previously supplied; and with Iraq, to install a secondary surveillance radar at Baghdad where Selenia has already built an air traffic control center.

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Selenia is also participating in the national "air navigation aids and air traffic control" program launched under the auspices of the Italian National Research Council. Its "radars and civil systems" division is engaged in study of a type of new generation secondary radar, the DABS (Discrete Address Beacon System); at a more general level it is studying all the means and procedures for improvement and greater effectiveness of the methods of controlling air traffic.

For the naval systems division of Selenia the year 1978 was marked by great success at the commercial levels, the result of many years devoted to development of equipment for naval armament and to prospecting in foreign markets. The order placed by the Ecuadorean navy for six corvettes to be built by the Cantieri Navoli Riuniti resulted in Selenia's supplying six RAN 10S search radars, 12 Orion 10X tracking radars connected to the NA model 3 fire control systems, six Albatros missile launching systems (launcher works four tubes), and an IPN10 Command and Control System (a vertical console and a horizontal console for three operators).

The order by the Italian navy for six frigates of the Maestrale class, for Selenia meant supplying six RAN 10S search radars, six Albatros missile launching systems with Orion 30X single impulse tracking radar, six IPN10 command and control systems in the configuration with four vertical consoles for a single operator, and four horizontal tactical consoles for three operators.

Last, with the order by the Nigerian navy for a 3,500 ton frigate, Selenia has obtained a contract for equipping the ship with an Albatros missile launching system with eight tubes coupled with the HSA firing control center.

For the radar and missiles division the year 1978 was marked at once by consolidation of the position in the foreign market of the new Selenia RAT-315 third generation three-dimensional radar (the number of units on order exceeds 20) intended for air defense, by the completion of operational tests by the Italian air force of the Argos-10 new long range radar now being mass produced for NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and Italian national defense requirements, and by mass production of Pluto radars intended for detection of small remotely guided missiles in skimming flight.

During the year 1978 the number of foreign navies which have adopted the Albatros/Aspide system increased to four while the first Aspide missiles intended for foreign markets (to equip the Peruvian frigate Caravajal) came off the assembly line.

This review would not be complete without mention of the important activity of Selenia in the space sector in 1978. Mention must be made here that Selenia furnished, for the Exosat satellite of the European Space Agency, an on-board computer and installed a coherent transponder operating in band 5 as well. In addition, and still for the Agency, Selenia is studying and perfecting a 20/30 gigahertz transponder combined with a high gain antenna which should meet the requirements of space telecommunications in the 1980 decade. Furthermore Selenia has continued study and definition of the antennas for the ECS satellite, a program for which construction of systems

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for reception and retransmission of telemetry and remote control signals has been assigned to Selenia.

Last year also saw the commencement of production of antennas and telecommunications equipment intended for the seven Intelsat V satellites which will be launched.

Finally, a point to be emphasized: the good operating behavior of Selenia space equipment: the Serio and Meteosat satellites, launched in the second quarter of 1977 and the OTS satellite of the European Space Agency, launched last year, were equipped with antennas and telecommunications equipment constructed by Selenia; all are operating very well.

The participation by Selenia in the next International Aeronautics Salon at the Le Bourget airport next June, will be a very important event: an exhibit of some 300 square meters in Hall Bano, if possible, demonstration of a full-size 3D three-dimensional radar operating under actual conditions.

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SPAIN

COMMENTARY LOOKS INTO PRE-ELECTION POLITICS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 14 Jan 78 p 13

[Article by Jose Oneto: "The Million Votes"]

[Text] The two leading political forces in the country, UCD [Democratic Center Union] and PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] will participate in the 1 March elections on their own, and will not form any type of coalition with other groups either to the right or left of them, according to reports attributed to the leaders of the two majority parties.

In this regard, both the Socialists who tried at the last minute to play the card of investiture when they realized that the general elections were inevitable, and the Centrists, many of whom expressed a desire to shun the 1 March elections, are now studying the respective electoral slates, which will cause serious criticism and division in both parties.

It is the government party itself which intends to make the largest number of changes among the candidates for the various senatorial and congressional positions. Of the 166 deputies which UCD had prior to the dissolution of the Chambers, only between 60 and 70 will retain their status as candidates. The rest of the positions will be filled by experts in various fields, who will attempt to replace those who confined themselves for a year and a half to remaining silent in their seats, without making any important contribution either on the commissions or in the plenums. With this arrangement, the government party is trying to form a strong, specialized and coherent parliamentary group that will prove capable of battling the opposition on the various Congressional and Senate commissions.

This is precisely what concerns the Socialists, who will also make changes on their tickets, but who have more internal agreement than does the government party, among the leaders of the PSOE, who think that, of the 125 members of Parliament that the group had, nearly 100 will retain their status as candidates. In other words, they think that 30 or 40 new candidates selected from among professional people and technicians who have been entering the party's ranks will be joining the slates. There will disappear from the slates a group of individuals used for padding them in the previous elections

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who, to the genuine surprise of the PSOE itself, obtained their certificates as deputies on 15 June 1977.

In any event, the chief concern of both political groups is the disenchantment and apathy of the voters, which has been reflected in all the polls and which materialized in the constitutional referendum of 6 December. If one adds to this the fact that the election campaign is going to be held during a month of February which the meteorologists have already predicted as rainy, and marked by difficult weather conditions, with half of Spain covered by snow and the other half by rain, the candidates' effort may be minimal. There will be no more of those rallies with thousands upon thousands of people which typified the 1977 election campaign; and there will also be no opportunity for the candidates to talk personally with the largest possible number of voters.

Hence, the election campaign will take place through the daily and weekly press and on television in particular; and the latter will therefore have to observe strict neutrality, more than ever before.

A little less than a week before the opening of the election campaign, both the Centrists and the Socialists consider themselves convinced of their electoral victory and of winning a majority. Although, during May, the vice-president of the government, Fernando Abril, had notified Alfonso Guerra, the PSOE's number two man, that there would be generals if a pact similar to the Moncloa pact of last year were not signed, the Socialists were certain that the current president would not risk everything on a single card, with the majority in his party of an opposing view.

Nevertheless, Suarez has dared to take the great leap forward at a time when the PSOE's coffers are virtually empty, when the economic funds that were coming from a Venezuela governed by Carlos Andres Perez, whose party was defeated in December, have just been cut off, and when Felipe Gonzalez' strategy was aimed at winning municipal elections which have definitively consolidated the Socialist alternative. At any rate, the PSOE, under more adverse conditions, intends to work hard to obtain that million votes which it needs in order to come to power. An attempt will be made to vie for that same million by UCD, with greater financial resources and with the power of the government, but with a right that is right of it (Areilza-Fraga-Osorio) which already has 1 billion pesetas for a campaign that will not be popular, with the goal of seating between 20 and 30 deputies in the new Cortes. And there will be no pre-electoral pacts for this. PSOE and UCD will go in search of the lost million on their own....

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SPAIN

SPECULATION ON PSOE ELECTION VICTORY PUBLISHED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 19 Jan 79 pp 14-18

[Text] Three years ago, they seized an Andalusian newspaper for publishing the photograph of a certain "Isidoro." On 1 March, "Isidoro," the clandestine name of Felipe Gonzalez, may be the next president of the government, if Suarez should lose the elections.

Felipe Gonzalez, secretary general of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party [PSOE], who has yet to move, so as to complete the furnishing of the apartment that he has just bought in Pinar de Chamartin, is ready to pack his bags again, to crate his books and records, to fold his seven suits and 18 ties, to bring along Carmen, his wife, and his sons Pablo and David, and the new-born child, Carmencita, and to take up residence in the Moncloa Palace in a matter of days.

Gonzalez has everything in readiness, in case Suarez loses. And not only Gonzalez, but also the party's executive board and the young cadres of the oldest party in the country, which will be exactly 100 years old this year.

If Suarez loses and the PSOE wins, something will change in Spain. On the eve of the elections, with only one month left before the election campaign begins, the PSOE's experts are making slight changes in their party's platform in order to remove chaff, not to cause fright and to win those necessary votes for coming to power. The PSOE is no longer asking for nationalization in general, but rather for minimal nationalization, so as to have appeal. The banks will be respected. Marxism will be diluted. Taxes will, indeed, be raised moderately. Divorce will be legalized immediately, and an attempt will be made to offer free schooling for everyone. The police and the army will be provided with effective facilities for performing their missions, and the possibility of joining NATO will be halted. The commitments to the United States will, of course, be kept. An effort will be made to reduce unemployment, even at the expense of a rise in inflation. The subsidy to the state press will be withdrawn, and the state monopoly on television will continue....

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It was on 2 May 1879, to be exact. In a humble bar on Tetuan Street in Madrid a group of men were holding a "universal brotherhood" dinner. Over dessert, they discussed politics, platforms and laws. Calderon, Vera, Iglesias, Oncina and Zubiazurre were the names of the best known table companions, who had unanimously decided to form a political party. This is how the Spanish Socialist Workers Party came into existence.

A century later, the PSOE is preparing to fulfill a twofold requirement in the midst of jubilation, impatience and anticipation: to celebrate the centennial of its founding, and to face the general elections that will take place on 1 March.

The surprising decision of President Suarez to dissolve the Cortes and call general elections has made the PSOE a potential candidate for occupying Moncloa, although the prognostications indicate that this is unlikely.

No one would bet on Suarez' downfall, and the crystal balls of the probers are now heralding results very similar to those of 15 June 1977; but sometimes the election elves play unpredictable tricks. Note the recent defeat, contrary to all predictions, of the Venezuelan "ADs" [Social Democrats] at the hands of the COPEIs [Christian Democrats].

Suarez Loses, Felipe Wins

And what if Suarez loses? Then PSOE wins, of course. And if Gonzalez reaches Moncloa to head a Socialist government, the country will have a government group whose model society is considerably far removed not just from the Francoist prototype that Spain has had for the past 40 years, but also from the model proposed by UCD [Democratic Center Union]. Politics, economics, education, public order, culture, the armed forces, groups and institutions will all have to set their pace according to the pendulum of the Socialists, whose leaders many consider to fluctuate between inexperience and enthusiasm, but who are endowed with the estimable qualities of indisputable democratic credibility and a clean service record. They claim that, with the PSOE, Spain will be more democratic, more just and also more merry. At the moment, the PSOE's leaders are reacting to the request for election forecasts with the naive assurance and innocent conviction of a super-welterweight without any vices. "We want to win, and we shall win." And, at their next congress, they are planning to remove the stigma of being called "Marxists," hovering over them.

But what about the problems? The recent poll published by this magazine (see CAMBIO 16, No 370) listed unemployment, terrorism and prices, in that order, as the three ferocious wolves that are terrifying the sovereign people in 1979.

Attack on the Army

The Socialists have solutions for all of them, and for many others, such as NATO, the armed forces, education, television or divorce. Enrique Mugica

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and Javier Solana, members of the PSOE's executive board, accompanied by Miguel Boyer, a Socialist expert in economic affairs, gave CAMBIO 16 their views concerning the Socialists' first actions if they should win the forthcoming elections.

No 370 of CAMBIO 16 contained a poll prepared by Metra Seis, in which unemployment, terrorism and prices, in that order, were revealed to be the three most serious concerns of Spaniards for 1979. However, it is possible that the order of priority of the nation's fears has undergone a change as this article is being written. Last Wednesday afternoon, 3 January, the military governor of Madrid, Div Gen Constantino Ortin Gil, was shot to death at the door of his house in Madrid by the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group].

Impressed by the tragic incident, Enrique Mugica, a PSOE deputy and chairman of the Congressional Defense Committee, told this magazine that the handling of terrorism "requires some political measures, without which the police measures would be inadequate and unworkable. There are minority sectors in the Basque Country which do not accept those political measures, and those minorities (ETA) are attempting to destabilize the situation by attacking a sector such as the military, which have made Spanish unity a tradition and a constant trait of their conduct. ETA does not attack individuals, but rather uniforms. So, there is no solution other than to reduce those minorities which do not accept political measures. But, in order to do so, the political measures must be enacted to reduce and curb the sphere of action of the terrorist groups."

However, the Socialists do not hesitate to request very forcefully the enactment of severe police measures and professional personnel for the forces of public order.

Mugica continued: "Up until last summer, there were only 12 men in Guipuzcoa who were engaged in terrorism. The car radios did not reach more than a radius of 35 kilometers beyond San Sebastian, and the police had only 25 cartridges per year for training purposes. They had to pay for any more out of their own wages, and the latter are not assured. Apart from this, the government, which has been a weak government, has neglected to offer the forces of public order the facilities for a new mentality, a mentality and a conduct. It has not done everything possible to gear the state security corps to the situation in the Basque Country. I think that the forces perform not because the government has done anything, but because they have capable and responsible leaders; not because the government has established guidelines or set an example."

According to the Socialists, there is an urgent need to establish a Basque police force, although the suppression of terrorism and crime is incumbent on the forces of public order. According to Mugica, "The autonomous police should see to order in the streets, but they can never be the Trojan horse of independent orientation."

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He added: "The defense of democracy must be multi-directional also. All those who are opposed to legality, regardless of what movement they are in, must be brought to trial; liability must be required. The same action should be taken against those who advocate coups as against those who engage in armed struggle."

In any event, Mugica refers to the CAMBIO 16 poll in which, in answer to the question as to which party was considered capable of coping with terrorism, 17.6 percent mentioned the PSOE, while only 3.4 percent mentioned the UCD.

Army, in the Same Boat

Mugica believes that the army would not be opposed to a PSOE government, and that the index of acceptance of the Socialists in the armed forces is very high. He said: "I think that they are aware of the fact that the PSOE is associated with a strictly Spanish historical tradition, and that at no time during its 100-year history has it given in to foreign interference; and also because I think that they realize that the PSOE has an authentic concept of the state and of authority, and sufficient strength based on the nation's desires."

The Socialists also believe that they must convince the military family that "we are in the same boat, that we must defend unity and the democratic system together; and that this is good for them and for everyone. We must convince them that they may equal the Socialists in patriotism, but that they cannot surpass us. Democracy will be good for the army; it will be properly provided with everything that it lacks at present. It must have sufficient material resources, with salaries on a par with the civilian professional salaries of the equivalent rank."

The Socialists likewise think that the majority of units should be operative, and not as at present, when there are only a few special units (naval groups, paratroopers, etc.) which are. This requires new systems and an updating of tables of organization.

Mugica remarks: "It will cause traumas at first, but it will be beneficial in the long run. We Socialists will do it, meeting the expectations concerning rank and salaries for the current officers on active duty."

With regard to facilities, the PSOE feels that there is a need for a Spanish arms technology, and the creation of major series of manufacture; even though this may cause exports of arms. Mugica said: "Spain exports about \$150 million worth of arms per year, while Israel, which has a population similar to that of Madrid, and which is surrounded by enemies on all sides, exports \$400 million worth and France exports nearly \$6 billion worth."

Another important area to Socialists in the military field is that of training. They say that the army must be united with the people, and the military must be formed and educated according to the guidelines in the recently approved Constitution.

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Mugica adds: "In this way, the military will be understood by the people. In the academies, the technical courses must be reconciled with humanistic values: values related to freedoms, the people, citizenship, etc., from a constitutional standpoint."

Finally, the Socialists also have clearcut ideas regarding NATO. Mugica remarks: "We do not consider it either necessary nor feasible to join NATO. NATO was beneficial at its beginnings, at the height of the cold war. Now, at the present time when there is an easing of tensions, Spain's entry into NATO would destroy the current balance of forces." However, there are some means of substitution. According to the PSOE, Spain could contribute to the defense of the West, of which it is a part, through the mutual defense treaty with the United States.

Mugica adds: "In 1981, when a study is made of the renewal of the treaty, the Socialists might possibly back the signing of a new one, on a level of mutual equality, in exchange for which the condition would have to be met that the bases in Spain would be denuclearized. Unquestionably, we cannot be neutral, because only the superpowers can be. We have a treaty with the United States which we can use as the basis for a treaty with reciprocal equality."

U.S.A.: There Are No Problems

What about Washington? How would the "protectors" of the West react to a Socialist government in Spain? According to several sources queried by CAMBIO 16 in Washington, if Adolfo Suarez were defeated in the forthcoming elections, those in charge of foreign policy in Washington would receive a shock...but they would endure it.

Both in government circles and in those of the U.S. Congress which follow Spanish affairs, Suarez is unanimously considered a good prime minister who has done everything very well, and who apparently enjoys popularity and support among the citizens. Since the UCD's foreign policy almost always coincides with the principles of Western defense based on the "made in U.S.A." style, Washington has given its blessing to the continuity of Suarez.

However, if the PSOE should win it would not be too much of a shock. In Washington, they would prefer a Socialist victory to that of Popular Alliance, not to mention that of Carrillo's PCE [Spanish Communist Party], the Eurocommunist version of which has evoked but little enthusiasm on the other side of the Atlantic.

As Michael Ledden, a former aide to Henry Kissinger and professor at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies, told CAMBIO 16: "The objectives of the Carter administration insofar as Spain is concerned are two: that democracy be consolidated, and that the Spanish commitment to the West continue. And there is no doubt whatever of the Socialists' attitude toward those two principles."

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Professor Ledden added: "I am sure that the Carter administration would prefer that Suarez remain in power, but it would not be overly concerned if Gonzalez were to replace him."

The officials of the Carter administration who were questioned by CAMBIO 16, for their part, constantly attempted to maintain the "sacred principle" of non-intervention. In his office at the White House, James Schlesinger, a member of the National Security Council which is chaired by Brzezinski and serves as an organ for consultation by the president on defense matters, declared: "The only thing that we can say is that we favor the strengthening of the democratic forces in Spain." After this, the representatives of the Executive Branch remained silent, or remarked that, "It is the Spanish people who must decide on the type of government that they want;" or, "The Socialists have behaved very responsibly when it was time for the construction of democracy."

In the opinion of the analysts, the fact that the high-ranking officials in the Executive Branch have refused to praise the PSOE is a clear indication of their preference for Suarez, whom they do not begrudge any kind of compliment; but there is significance in the fact that they acknowledge the possibility that the Socialists may come to power: The last time that the Italian Communist leader, Enrico Berlinguer, was about to come to power in Italy, the Carter administration forgot its principle of non-intervention and declared itself definitely opposed to the idea.

Finally, the issue of NATO and the PSOE's opposition to Spain's entry into the organization do not bother Washington either.

Ledden, former aide to Kissinger, told this magazine: "The fundamental and immediate objective of Spanish foreign policy is not NATO, but rather Europe; and the PSOE's European policy is not substantially different from that of UCD...."

Money and Unemployment

And how does the PSOE view the other two scourges which are already plaguing Spain's 1979, namely, unemployment and inflation?

Without problems, they claim.

At the moment, the Socialist Party believes that the current package of measures for fighting inflation is brutal and Draconian; and that, as usual, the hardest and most painful part of the measures must be borne by the economically weakest classes.

CAMBIO 16 was told by Miguel Boyer, a definite candidate for the Ministry of Economy: "We favor a less brutal adjustment in the battle against inflation, so as to allow the increase in unemployment to stop and investment to increase. In 1979, the government intends to reduce the GNP price index by

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7.7 percent, which is a brutal figure when one considers the fact that this index declined only 3 percent in 1978."

According to Boyer: "If it is intended to continue the fight against inflation with such harshness, this would be at odds with the attempt to stop the increase in unemployment and to promote investment. If everything is attempted, nothing will be gained; because these are opposing plans. It is impossible to attempt a real growth in investment of 8.4 percent, as the government wishes. That is a brutally high rate, with a restrictive monetary and credit policy in the battle against inflation.

"What do they want? Another 200,000 unemployed? To continue without investment? Inflation could be reduced in that way, but at what price? We Socialists think that there should be a less restrictive and harsh monetary and credit policy which, instead of attempting a 12 percent rise in the GNP index, would make that figure 14 percent; and this would cause a greater increase in internal demand. We also claim that the 8.4 investment index is utopian and unrealistic; and that it cannot rise above 3 percent. With these measures that we propose, the consumer price index, instead of increasing by the 10 percent proposed by the government between December 1978 and December 1979, would stand at 12 percent.

"In short, what we propose is to eliminate the contradictions in the government's economic policy, and to wage a less Draconian and more gradual battle against inflation."

According to the PSOE, the brutal 7.7 percent reduction in GNP prices during 1979 would cause an additional 100,000 unemployed during that same period. And in Spain, there is little work, and few are employed. Only 36 percent of Spaniards are producing and supporting with their employment the other 64 percent; and, therefore, we can presume that we have the lowest rate of job activity in Europe, ranging between 45 and 50 percent. Boyer remarks: "We cannot exacerbate this situation with more unemployment and more early retirements."

Without Exaggeration

Hence, it is a matter of recovering investment and increasing employment. But how can that be done? What plans does the PSOE have in store, in the hypothetical event that it should come to power after the elections? Boyer says that it plans to fight inflation, but without exaggeration, as the UCD government has done, in his opinion.

Three points will comprise the tripod backing the PSOE in its economic policy to battle unemployment and declining investment. Forcing public investment (as in France and Great Britain where, when private investment declined and savings increased, the state collected funds and invested), combined with a more realistic price policy and with forceful action to support industry.

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However, in order to force the public investment that the Socialists propose financing must be found. How? With more taxes and with a larger budget deficit. Nearly 70 billion pesetas more of budgetary spending than the figure proposed by the UCD government.

Of that amount, 10 percent would go to civil servants, so that their salaries will not be so different from those of the workers in the private sector. In exchange for this, there would be a freeze on personnel increases and a required increase in the work productivity of the civil servants, making them comply strictly with schedules and work standards.

And what about the taxes? Nearly 50 billion more, to be borne by Spaniards. Boyer says: "And we don't mind saying so, although we know that it will not benefit us in the elections to do so." Of that sum, 34 billion would be direct, and 15 billion indirect. Despite everything, the tax pressure in this country is among the slightest in Europe, in comparison with the GNP. In Spain, taxes and social security payments total 27 percent of the GNP; whereas in the countries of the European Economic Community they represent between 37 and 47 percent.

And what nationalizations would there be? Very few; and, of course, the banks are not included among them. At most, there would be measures to control credit. According to Boyer, limitations would be placed on the iron and steel industry as a whole, which is on its last legs; and, in the field of energy, on the high tension system. To those who claim that this entails an almost "Soviet" measure, the Socialists explain that, in the West, in nearly all the countries except Belgium, Japan and the United States, the aforementioned system belongs to the state. Likewise, over the long term, the new power-plants, and the nuclear ones in particular, should be turned over to the state, which can guarantee better conditions for ecological protection and security than can the private sector.

The issue of education is perhaps the one that aroused the greatest emotion in the constitutional debates.

Javier Solana is aware of this when he observes: "The issue of education is difficult, and the constitutional development of Article 27 is going to be a problem, as we have already noted in the progress of the Constitution. In any event, from the standpoint of the educational reform that we advocate, the PSOE takes two areas into consideration; one that is quantitative, and another that is qualitative. We cannot disregard the fact that there is a shortage of 800,000 classroom seats for preschool education and EGB [basic general education?]; and that, in BUP [expansion unknown], only 35 percent of the young people of an age to receive this type of education are attending school, while in Europe the figure is 90 percent."

He adds: "As for the qualitative area, we propose a thorough democratization of the educational system, not only in the schools, but also in the educational planning." And what about divorce? It is imminent, according to the PSOE. Solana claims that a divorce law is urgently needed, and if the PSOE is in the government, it will be enacted immediately.

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No to Private "Tele"

Finally, on the subject of state-owned television, the PSOE advocates a statute which differs from the one proposed by UCD only in minor details; while it is flatly opposed to any possibility of the establishment of privately owned television in our country.

With regard to the state's media, the Socialists' position is clearly that of a liquidating commission. In a four-point proposal devised by the party, it calls for the economic operation of the news media through a corporation in which the state would underwrite all the capital, and the board of administration would consist of individuals designated by Congress in proportion to the representation gained by the various political parties. Subsequently, the operation would be turned over to the new company, which would not have any kind of subsidy, nor economic assistance.

And so, the stirring of Socialist hopes for the almost imminent elections is founded upon the next congress, at which there will be a recurrence of the "Felipe bomb" which exploded last May in Barcelona: the PSOE's abandonment of Marxism. The problem no longer seems to be too important to the members of the Executive Board questioned by CAMBIO 16. Mugica remarks: "To ask the PSOE about Marxism is like asking the Christian Democrats about scholasticism. There is room for everyone in our party, from the Marxist Socialists to the humanists of Christian or secular origin, or the Social Democrats." Javier Solana, for his part, adds that a party is not Marxist, just as a factory or a store is not. "It is people who are. And in the PSOE, one can be a Marxist or not, and nothing will happen. In political parties, it is the platforms and their implementation that are important...."

If the Socialists Are in Command

Forget the bourgeois society. Don't mention social democracy, much less the social dictatorship of the state. Forget all that, because (let's suppose) the PSOE has won the general elections of 1 March, and is beginning to construct a new model of society.

All at once two things have happened: We have progressed from an autocratic, dictatorial regime to a formal democracy, and from that democracy to a state in which the supremacy belongs to the working class.

The third and final phase, socialism, that is, a classless society, is still green, but it will ripen if the transition program devised by the 27th Congress of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party remains steadfast. In other words, that of the last congress. However, to some, 2 years have now elapsed since the date of the congress in December 1976, and today the Socialists are smiling at the basic principles declared at the 27th Congress. Mugica comments: "Everything will change considerably at our next congress."

But, before continuing, there are two important things that the PSOE is saying: Socialism can only be constructed with the backing of the majority of

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the people, and it can only be accomplished completely and definitively on a worldwide scale.

Since you are a resident of a municipality, you are interested in learning that, from the time when the PSOE begins giving orders in this country, all citizens will be able to participate in the regulation and planning of their respective municipal areas.

Among other things, the municipalities may intervene directly in the housing market, particularly that of the working class. Rents will be cheap, and the terms for obtaining ownership will be very advantageous.

Another goal is to make the land municipal; and a second one is to tax income and property intensively and progressively.

There will also be a tendency to municipalize local services and, as a priority, public transportation will tend to be free of charge.

You will have work, because the prime objective of the Socialist economic policy is full employment. And the work day will be reduced to 40 hours a week. Vacations will gradually be lengthened, and there will be voluntary retirement at age 60.

If you are a woman, the same holds true, because no one will discriminate against you. And if you do laborious or monotonous work, you will work less. There will be an adequate social security system for all citizens, to cope with any situation.

What if you become ill? Look at what the PSOE says: "Health is a right which the state must guarantee for citizens, seeing to it that everyone has access, on equal terms, to the preventive, treatment and rehabilitation health services."

As for education, the PSOE claims that it will be democratic, free of charge, secular (the courses in religion that are compulsory in schools and study plans will disappear) and public, with the gradual elimination of private schools.

But all this, and some other things as well, are not free. They have to be paid for. How? Well, with greater tax pressure. An essential goal of the Socialist economic policy will be to raise the proportion of public revenue to 30 percent of the GNP during the next 5 years; and to 35 percent during the following 5 years.

If you are a banker, all the worse. The PSOE's program for private banks is aimed at converting "the accomplishment of a series of bank nationalizations into a realistic requirement in the process of socialism for the Spanish economy."

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Since we are all consumers, we are greatly concerned with what the PSOE says about eliminating the unnecessary middlemen, fostering cooperatives and insuring the presence of the producers in the marketing of their products.

And something else: The advertising of "harmful products," such as alcohol and tobacco, will be banned, as will that of medicines; and there will be no advertising on government television.

You will feel the PSOE in every action of your life, even in the "mili." But there you will have an advantage, if they keep their word: Military service, which will be compulsory for everyone, will be paid for "so as to meet the individual needs of the soldier." Social security will also meet his family's needs, in the event that they exist.

And there is more. Military service will be divided into three phases: the first, in special camps; the second, in army units; and the third, consisting of a short course in the locality in which the citizen resides.

But, if you are a woman, do not be upset. The PSOE has thought of this, too, because it is of the opinion "that it is essential for women to have a place in the military machine;" although the program does not say anything more specific.

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SPAIN

PUBLIC OPINION POLL RESULTS: SUAREZ MOST POPULAR

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 24 Dec 78 pp 36-38, 40, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50

[Text] Adolfo Suarez "is liked" by 49.6 percent of Spain; another 26.9 percent would vote for him tomorrow for president, and 41.9 percent think that he is a middle-of-the-roader. Suarez has reversed the drop in his popularity at the beginning of the year and now enjoys good political health.

He has an irresistible popular charm, especially among women. He is far ahead of his most immediate rival, Felipe Gonzalez, and Manuel Fraga is no longer in sight. Moreover, Spaniards have given him passing marks in his political performance. His name is Adolfo Suarez; he is 46 years old and has been the president of the government since 3 July 1976.

He has been called everything during these 2½ years in power. The far right has branded him a traitor. Fraga and his alliance members have called him inept. The PCE [Spanish Communist Party] and the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] haggle with him over democracy, and the far left attacks him pitilessly.

He has had his downs when there were desertions in his party or when escalating terrorism has intimidated the country. He has changed ministers and endured attempted coups such as "Operation Galaxia." He has buried Franco's laws and made possible a consensus constitution.

March was the president's low point. The expectations of those who had voted for him on 15 June 1977 plummeted, and when Metra Seis asked Spaniards whether Suarez enjoyed the same support as he did at the beginning, 40 percent thought that it was less.

Suarez was sinking. At that time, March 1978, only 16.4 percent of the people dared to assert that the president had won the trust of the nation, whereas in September 1976 almost half of the Spanish people, 44.6 percent, swore that he had earned that trust.

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Many things have happened from March until late November, on the eve of the referendum. The rise in terrorism has become a serious concern, which was bad for Suarez and his administration; but amid the difficulties the text of the constitution, the priority goal, was being drawn up.

Unemployment was growing, and crime, especially in the big cities, was up to its old tricks, bringing fear to the streets. These were two other negative notes, but their psychological effects were smoothed out as Suarez and his party, in the midst of debate on the constitution, tried to explain again and again that the constitution was number one.

But how do Spaniards regard this "traitor," this "inept" individual, this "new democrat," who buried Francoism and arranged for a constitution that has returned sovereignty to the people?

CAMBIO 16 asked Metra Seis to do a survey on this and other questions. The most significant answer that emerged was this: since March of this year, when the president's appeal had dropped to levels that were of great concern to the government, Adolfo Suarez has been rebuilding his image.

Suarez on the Rise

The First Congress of the UCD [Democratic Center Union], at which it strives to present Spaniards with the image of a homogeneous, progressive party, could also have helped to buoy Suarez.

Perhaps so did his firm stand regarding the military coup of "Operation Galaxia." Two military men were detained; another was arrested for disobeying the minister of defense, and the opposition, aside from the hesitations of Popular Alliance (AP), closed ranks around the defense of democracy.

The long road to the constitution was marked by those and other incidents that have not succeeded in destroying Suarez's popular image.

From March, the low point, until November, according to the Metra Seis poll, his image has stabilized, with even a slight upward trend. Over those 9 months Suarez's popularity not only did not decline; it even regained ground: up 1.4 points over March.

A few days before the referendum, Spaniards' opinion of Suarez had not changed in 50.7 percent of the cases, improved in 18.2 percent and gotten worse in 16.8 percent. For the first time since the past election, the bottom line was a plus for the president.

But why did Suarez's collapse on the ides of March not intensify until it ultimately cost him his preponderance as a political leader. The

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answer from Metra Seis is clear: because of lower-middle and lower class Spaniards and those over 50 years of age.

Supporters in Four Regions

Those two social classes are in the majority in the country, and even though they are supposed to be a source of support for left-wing parties, in this specific case they have given their backing to the current president.

According to the poll, the regions of Castilla la Vieja-Leon, Catalonia, Andalucia and Extremadura have helped to bolster Suarez's image the most. Nevertheless, unemployment, which could be described as the government's "public enemy number one," is highest in two of these regions, Andalucia and Extremadura.

His upswing is also most noticeable in municipalities of between 2,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, and as far as the country's two major cities are concerned, Barcelona backs Suarez much more than Madrid. He has moved up four percent in that city but dropped 8.6 percent in Madrid.

But not all Spaniards look kindly on Suarez, and we can point to four segments of society among his harshest critics. Among the upper and upper-middle classes he has lost 24.8 percent, and among individuals with advanced schooling, 29.3 percent.

The other two groups of critics involve age: he has dropped 16.8 percent among 18 and 19 year olds and 9.9 percent among those 20 to 24.

Clear-Cut Approval

Among the regions that back Suarez the least, the Basque Country and Navarra head the list, where he has dropped 21.3 percent, followed by Aragon with just a 10 percent falloff. However, according to the survey, if elections were held tomorrow, Felipe Gonzalez would win overwhelmingly in Aragon.

Supposedly, when it came down to answering the Metra Seis question: How do you rate the president's performance, many Spaniards took into consideration unemployment, terrorism, the mismanagement that AP accuses him of and the traitorous acts that the far right pins on him.

Spaniards have given Suarez a narrow vote of confidence for all that he has and has not done over the 9 months from March to November. He was given an average mark of 5.6, which could be interpreted as meaning that his performance has topped a minimum level of acceptance by Spaniards.

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The president's performance is rated most highly by women, who have accorded him an average grade of 5.82. The Basques are his toughest graders, failing him roundly with a 3.87 mark. Youths age 18 and 19 and from 20 to 24 were also very demanding and assigned him no more than a 4.6 grade, which is failing as well.

Of course there is an enormous gap between that failing mark and the zero rating that 5.1 percent of Spaniards gave him. This is offset, however, by the outstanding "cum laude" that 7.6 percent of his fellow countrymen were kind enough to award him. Twenty percent of those polled by Metra Seis preferred not to comment on the president.

The President's Charm

Suarez's charm was another thing that we wanted to find out about, inasmuch as it is one of the leitmotifs in the president's personal references. The pollsters asked the following question: How do you like the president?

The responses could not have been more flattering to the UCD leader. Without having to embroider the facts, we can assert that Suarez's personal attraction extends beyond the bounds of middle-of-the-road voters.

By virtue of the president's "charm," 9.8 percent of the Spanish people like him very much; 49.6 percent like him; only 4.6 percent do not like him, and 3.3 percent do not like him at all. He prompts indifference in 24.1 percent, while the remaining 8.6 percent did not comment.

An analysis of the poll leads to other conclusions. For example, Suarez is liked by women more than by men (11.3 percent of females like him very much; 51.4 percent like him; only 3.7 percent do not, and just 2.4 percent not at all).

Another point in the analysis is that his popularity increases in direct relation to age. From 35.7 percent among 18 and 19 year olds, he rises to 68 percent among those over 50.

Suarez's personal attraction declines, however, among the upper classes and among individuals with advanced schooling. The national average of 3.3 percent who do not like the president rises to 7.2 percent among those with advanced schooling and to 7.6 percent among the upper and upper-middle classes.

In this regard, there is one geopolitical surprise: Aragon, which is dominated politically by Felipe Gonzalez, is one of the regions where Suarez gets a significantly higher rating than the average. He is at the same level in Asturias and Andalucia.

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In the two Castiles, Leon, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands and Levante, Suarez receives the average national mark for his charm, but in Galicia and especially in the Basque Country, things are not so good for him. In the latter region, only 25.5 percent like him, while those who are indifferent jump to 35.1 percent, and 17 percent do not like him.

Comparisons

But irresistible charm is one thing and politics is another. Since we feel that comparisons are not odious, we wanted to know how Spaniards compare Suarez with other political leaders.

He had to be matched against the country's influential politicians. Is Suarez much better, somewhat better, somewhat worse or much worse than Carrillo, Fraga, Felipe Gonzalez, Tierno Galvan or Jose Maria de Areilza?, the pollsters asked.

At least here Fraga is not number one. In the political race Suarez has greatly outdistanced the AP leader, whom he leads by 43.4 points. This is the largest gap, because the comparison with the rest of the leaders is not as advantageous.

Politically speaking, Suarez enjoys good health, ideologies aside. The president's political stature is slightly above that of Tierno Galvan, whom he leads by 5.1 points, and Felipe Gonzalez, over whom he holds a 12.6 percent advantage.

The gap between him and leaders other than these two Socialists is glaring. He is far ahead of Carrillo, 32.1 points, and even farther ahead of Areilza, 36.4 points.

The struggle centers around Suarez, Tierno and Felipe Gonzalez. The latter two are ahead of the president in some areas. For example, Tierno tops Suarez among men, the upper and upper-middle classes, individuals with minimal high school level studies, persons under age 35 and, in terms of geopolitical zones and population areas, in Asturias, Castilla la Vieja-Leon, Aragon and cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants, except Madrid and Barcelona.

Asturias, however, is where Professor Tierno Galvan is farthest ahead of Suarez, 25.8 percent. Next in according him a higher political evaluation than the president are individuals with advanced schooling (19.5 percent) and 18-19 year olds (17.6 percent).

Suarez in the Center

Felipe Gonzalez also outpaces Suarez among 18-19 year olds (9.2 percent), in the Basque Country (11.7 percent), in Aragon (5.4 percent) and in cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants, except Madrid and Barcelona.

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Suarez's political image has improved. He has more popular backing. Spaniards approve of his performance politically. People like him, and he is ahead of his rivals for power. But where on the spectrum is Adolfo Suarez?

From their conclusive reply, this is a question that Spaniards have grasped quite well. As far as 41.9 percent of the population is concerned, the president's position has not changed: he's in the center.

Of the remaining bloc, 29.5 percent place him to the right; 8.8 percent to the left, and 19.8 percent do not know or do not want to say.

The view that Spaniards hold of the president, straddling the civilized right and the center, means that Suarez has a well-defined popular image as a moderate middle-of-the-roader, an image somewhat more leftist than that of the government as a whole or the UCD itself, according to previous polls.

His moderate image is quite homogeneous among all the Spaniards polled, there being no significant differences according to sex, age, socio-cultural level or place of residence.

The only exception was the Basque Country, which sees Suarez as leaning somewhat more to the right, though still within what is called the civilized right or center-right.

For President

If Spaniards were called upon tomorrow to elect a government president, according to the Metra Seis poll, Adolfo Suarez would win in a landslide. No one at the moment is even close to him in this sense.

Not only that, but of all of Suarez's possible opponents in a hypothetical election, only Felipe Gonzalez and Tierno Galvan could be regarded as presidential material. The others, again according to the poll, would achieve disappointing results. Nonetheless, we have to be careful in interpreting these data because 27.3 percent of those polled did not voice an opinion, and another 15.1 percent stated categorically that they "wouldn't vote for any of them."

Given this reservation, Suarez would grab 26.9 percent of the votes; Felipe Gonzalez, 12.7 percent; Tierno, 11.3 percent, with the rest far behind: Fraga, 3.1; Carrillo, 2.9, and Areilza, 0.7.

An analysis of these poll results indicates that Felipe Gonzalez would win in Aragon and that Tierno would garner more votes among individuals with advanced schooling, among 18 to 24 year olds and in cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants, excluding Madrid and Barcelona.

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Suarez and Tierno would share first in Asturias, and the president, Felipe Gonzalez and Tierno Galvan would get the same number of votes in the Basque Country.

But an analysis of the results also leads to other conclusions. For example, Manuel Fraga, who commands only 3.1 percent support nationwide, is regarded as presidential material by 10.5 percent of the upper and upper-middle classes, 9 percent of individuals with intermediate schooling, 7.4 percent of those with advanced schooling, 6.7 percent of Galicia and 8.6 percent of Asturias.

Suarez likewise surpasses his national average (26.9 percent) among the lower class (31.3 percent), among those over age 35 (31.7 percent), in Galicia (40), Andalucia (35.5), Extremadura (38.6) and in municipalities of between 2,000 and 10,000 inhabitants.

Things would not go as well for the current president with individuals who have taken advanced studies, only 16.4 percent of whom would vote for him (way below his national average), with persons under age 35 (18.2 percent), in the Basque Country (10.6), in Aragon (17) and in cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants, except Madrid and Barcelona.

Felipe Gonzalez, with his nationwide average of 12.7 percent, would receive more election support in Aragon, which would give him 23.2 percent of its votes; in Levante, with 18.4 percent, and in cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants, except Madrid, where he would take 19.5 percent, and Barcelona, 18.

But if it were up to them, he would not be elected president by the Galicians, only 1.7 percent of whom would select him; the Asturians, 5.2 percent, or the residents of Extremadura, 6.8 percent. The upper and upper-middle classes don't like him much either; only 7.1 percent of them would vote for him.

This contrasts with Tierno Galvan, for whom 18 percent of the upper and upper-middle classes would vote, thus surpassing his national average of 11.3 percent. He was picked by 16.4 percent of the middle class, 20.5 percent of individuals with high school level studies and 18.5 percent of those with advanced schooling. The old professor also has a good reputation in Galicia and Asturias.

When the pollsters asked about immediate election alternatives, whether the municipal or general election elections should come first or be held at the same time, 42.6 percent of the Spanish people did not want to hear about it, presumably because of skepticism or indifference.

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The Municipal Elections First

Among those who replied, however, the dominant answer was that the municipal elections should be held first. This was the view of 33.8 percent of the Spanish people, compared to 17.1 percent who want the general elections first and 6.5 percent who would prefer to have them at the same time.

If general elections were held right now, PSOE and UCD would win about the same number of votes, the first time that such a result has emerged from a poll since the beginning of the year.

PSOE-UCD Neck and Neck

The Metra Seis poll indicated that 29.3 percent would vote for the government party and 29.8 percent for the PSOE. This is assuming that a constant 20 percent of registered voters would stay away from the polls and takes into account only the residents of municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants on the peninsula and in the Balearic Islands.

At this 29 percent vote level the UCD outpaces the PSOE among women, the upper, upper-middle and lower classes, individuals with intermediate schooling, those over 50 and in Galicia, Andalucia and Extremadura, as well as in municipalities of between 2,000 and 50,000 inhabitants.

The PSOE is a clear-cut winner over the government party among male voters, the lower-middle class, those under 35, in Asturias, the Basque Country, Aragon and Levante, as well as in cities with more than 200,000 residents, except Madrid, and in Barcelona

The election would be a close one between the two parties among the middle class, persons with primary schooling, a high school level education, advanced studies, individuals from 35 to 49 years of age, and in Castilla la Vieja-Leon, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, Castilla la Nueva, cities with from 50,000 to 200,000 inhabitants and in Madrid, although in all these cases the PSOE is slightly ahead.

What Is Your Opinion of President Suarez Since March of This Year?
(The same question was asked in September 1976 and March 1978)

	Sep 76	Mar 78	Nov 78
Has improved	59.7	11.9	18.2
Has gotten worse	6.5	28.3	16.8
The same	28.5	44.1	50.7
No answer	5.3	15.8	14.4

Do You Think That the President Has Gained or Lost Popular Support?

	Sep 76	Mar 78	Nov 78
Gained	71.2	16.8	20.2
Lost	5.1	40.0	25.9
	31		

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The same	16.8	21.2	29.1
Don't know	—	—	15.7
No answer	6.8	22.0	9.0

How Do You Like the President as a Person?

Very much	9.8
Well enough	49.6
Do not like	4.6
Do not like at all	3.3
Indifferent	24.1
No answer	8.6

Felipe Gonzalez Is Ahead of Suarez:

Among 18-19 year olds	+0.2
In the Basque Country	+11.7
In Aragon	+5.4
In cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants, except Madrid and Barcelona	+11.3

Tierno Is Ahead of Suarez:

Among men	+1.3
Among the upper and upper- middle classes	+3.7
Among 18-19 year olds	+3.7
Among 20-24 year olds	+12.5
Among persons 25 to 34	+13.4
In Asturias	+25.8
In Castilla la Vieja-Leon	+3.7
In Aragon	+9.9
In cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants, except Madrid and Barcelona	+11.3

How Would You Place on the Ideological Scale?

Extreme left	0.1
Left	0.4
Moderate left	8.3
Center	41.9
Civilized right	19.4
Right	8.6
Extreme right	1.5
Don't know	12.9
No answer	6.9

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Election Trends (with a hypothetical 20 percent voter abstention)

Parties	Mar 78	Jul 78	Nov 78
AP	2.6	3.8	2.9
UCD	18.7	15.3	29.3
PSOE	38.6	26.8	29.8
PCE	7.1	6.6	4.6
CDC [Democratic Convergence of Catalonia]	1.3	0.6	0.8
PNV [Basque Nationalist Party]	0.9	1.0	0.8
Others	4.4	2.5	6.6
No answer	26.4	43.5	25.2

Suarez's Political Position (on the basis of a seven point scale as follows: extreme left, 1; left, 2; moderate left/center left, 3; center, 4; civilized right/center right, 5; right, 6; extreme right, 7)

Segment of the Population	Average Mark for Suarez Based on All Responses
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Sex	
Men	4.4
Women	4.3
Social Class	
Upper and upper-middle	4.5
Middle	4.4
Lower-middle	4.4
Lower	4.4
Schooling	
Primary or less	4.4
Secondary	4.4
Teachers' school/intermediate	4.4
Advanced	
Age	
18-19	4.7
20-24	4.6
25-34	4.5
35-49	4.3
50 and older	4.3
Region/Nationality	
Galicia	4.2
Asturias	4.5
Castilla la Vieja-Leon	4.3

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Basque Country-Navarra	5.0
Aragon	4.5
Catalonia-Balearic Islands	4.6
Levante	4.3
Andalucia	4.3
Extremadura	4.4
Castilla la Nueva	4.3
Locality	
2,000 to 10,000	4.4
10,000 to 50,000	4.3
50,000 to 200,000	4.4
More than 200,000, except Madrid and Barcelona	4.5
Madrid	4.3
Barcelona	4.6

For Which of the Following Political Leaders Would You Vote for President?

	September 1978	November 1978
Fraga	4.3	3.1
Areilza	0.7	0.7
Suarez	19.9	26.9
F. Gonzalez	14.2	12.7
Tierno Galvan	13.3	11.3
Santiago Carrillo	3.5	2.9
None of the above	13.3	15.1
Don't know/no answer	31.9	27.3

If Elections Were Held Tomorrow, Which of These Parties Would You Vote For?

AP	September 1978	November 1978
AP	3.0	2.3
UCD	12.2	23.4
PSOE	21.4	23.8
CDC	0.5	0.6
PNV	0.8	0.7
PCE	5.3	3.7
Far right	0.1	0.4
Far left	0.1	1.7
Others	1.8	3.2
Don't know/no answer	37.3	40.3

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WEST GERMANY

WILLY BRANDT INTERVIEWED ON OWN, SPD FUTURE

Hamburg STERN in German 20 Dec 78 pp 19-22

[Text] Five weeks after his heart infarct Willy Brandt announced his wish to speak for the first time. In a STERN interview in his sick-room, the SPD head revealed how much trouble his illness is causing him, why his relationship with Egon Bahr is strained, what he thinks of the forging ahead of Hamburg Mayor Hans-Ulrich Klose, and what his position is with regard to Karl Carsten's candidacy for the office of federal president.

STERN: Mr Brandt, when you were hospitalized 5 weeks ago with a heart infarct, the public soon gained the impression that the SPD was suffering from lack of leadership. Had no one in the top leadership thought about the fact that you might drop out of the picture?

Brandt: The first reports about my illness were misleading. To be frank: During the first few days things were going pretty badly with me, but then I slowly made a comeback. The SPD, I believe, cannot be reproached for lack of leadership; after all, besides a chairman, it also has an 11-member presidium under a politically strong board of directors. Every economic enterprise and every military organization must be prepared for the possibility that someone will drive or be driven against a tree. Business must nevertheless go on.

STERN: Some of your party friends are blaming Egon Bahr, federal business manager of the SPD, for the fact that the organizational work is no longer clicking very well.

Brandt: This criticism is based on a good many misunderstandings and exaggerations. For almost exactly 20 years, Egon Bahr and I have not only lived through a great deal together, but we have also achieved much. Among old friends, as happens, a problem arises every now and then, but it is always removed in time, so that the cause, to which we have both subscribed, does not suffer damage. STERN, too, as one sees, can slip into completely incorrect formulations. At the end of 1976, Egon Bahr himself was not a little surprised when I took up a suggestion made by Helmut Schmidt and asked him to take over

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management of business at the federal level. Today, too, he will not contradict if one says that he was not exactly promised a future as party secretary. Anyway, the Hamburg party congress at the end of 1977 already honored his work with a high number of votes.

STERN: Why don't you propose that the party call on Egon Bahr to be general secretary? To all practical purposes he holds that position already.

Brandt: The party would not dream of introducing the office of a general secretary. This is not in keeping with our internal party organization.

STERN: Will you be able to lead the party fully after your recovery or will the doctors force you to take it easy?

Brandt: During the first half of next year, I will have to leave some things undone. When I go away to take a cure for 2 months at the end of December--I am not sure exactly where, either at Evian or a little farther south in France --I want to devote the 4 hours a day which I am allowed to work mainly to the North-South Commission. For the report on the new orientation of development policy is to be completed in the second half of the year. Before I collapsed or, more precisely: before I was struck down, I had come to an agreement with UN General Secretary Waldheim that, if at all possible, the report should be presented in October. I will maintain my usual daily contact with Bonn, so that I'll know what's up, and if I can give advice anywhere, I will give it.

STERN: And what is the situation with regard to the election campaigns in Rheinland-Pfalz, Berlin and Schleswig-Holstein?

Brandt: The doctor would like me to take it easy in March and April. I can therefore not participate in the three election campaigns as I had planned. In May I will go at it full time and speak at 60 rallies for the Europe election--but only at two events a day.

STERN: Will you groom a successor during next year?

Brandt: I don't understand the question.

STERN: Who would be most suited to become your successor?

Brandt: In German social democracy, there has never been a crown prince, if that is what you mean. The successor of Brandt, if the party wants it, will for the time being be Willy Brandt, and if he, in a figurative sense, drives into a tree and can't get up, there will be deputies, and as for the rest one will have to see.

STERN: Does the fact that Hamburg Mayor Hans-Ulrich Klose is suddenly getting a lot of publicity with side trips, for example with statements on the subject of the radicals decree, have something to do with your absence?

Brandt: The Hamburg mayor already took a public stand on the question of extremists prior to the Hessen election in October--which, for tactical

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reasons, not all regarded as the best possible time. It is quite all right for me to reveal here that I, too, told him: "Ulli, if things turn out badly in Hessen, you may be in trouble." But there is no disputing the fact that without Klose's involvement it would have been more difficult to arrive at a position on the question of extremists that is acceptable to all Social Democrats. It was Hans Koschnick, however, who shouldered the main burden of work.

STERN: Can you guarantee that all SPD minister presidents and ministers will forego the standard inquiry to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, as demanded by the party resolution of 10 December?

Brandt: I do not have at my disposal the sanction of physical punishment, but I proceed from the assumption that the resolution will be observed.

STERN: Does your positive evaluation of Klose also include his statements on Stamokap [state monopoly capitalism]?

Brandt: Oh, you know, for our average countrymen, the utterance of the word "Stamokap" today is about equal to someone farting in company--something that is not done. Klose made the mistake of letting himself get involved in a discussion of this logogram in the first place. For what he wanted to say had already occurred to others among us as well. As you know, we do not only have a market economy in the Federal Republic.

STERN: And what do you think of Klose's main thesis that the state is turning more and more into the repair shop for capitalism?

Brandt: That, too, is not without justification. But for that I don't need the term Stamokap. Everyone calls after the state when things are going worse somewhere!

STERN: Have you ever wondered what actually might motivate Klose to confront ticklish topics in rapid sequence? Is someone there offering himself for higher tasks?

Brandt: Do I have to think about this aloud? We knew beforehand that wheels were turning in his head. And I consider it proper that someone who has won an election does not simply settle down in a comfortable chair.

STERN: Do you think, then, that Klose is one of those who belong to the coming generation of leaders, one of those who are good for any office?

Brandt: Yes, for many important tasks. Such people exist not only in Northern Germany, but also in the South.

STERN: Whom do you have in mind there?

Brandt: Well, I am thinking of the rejuvenated cabinet and, because of regional balance and age group, I will name the minister for research, Volker Hauff. Or think of the advancing leadership personnel in the party's board of directors and in the Bundestag fraction. Or our new Laedner chiefs: Johannes Rau

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In Duesseldorf, Holger Boerner in Hessen, Dietrich Stobbe in Berlin. Oskar Lafontaine in the Saarland and Klaus Matthiesen in Kiel, after all, are almost veterans among the new generation of recruits. That is especially true of Klaus von Dohnanyi, Hans Apel, and Hans Koschnick, who, you know, is also not yet 50. I am now running the danger of not mentioning other important names. But I won't let anyone come up to me and talk about the inadequate rising generation in the leadership of the SPD.

■ STERN: At the first SPD party congress in which you were unable to participate, your party 2 weeks ago in Cologne demanded the 35-hour week for Europe and the prohibition of the lock-out. In domestic policy its formulations were more cautious. Are there two parties--one for home consumption and one for the big, wide world?

- Brandt: I do not regard the reduction of working time as the main goal in the struggle against unemployment. And with regard to the lock-out one must know that it is not lawful in a number of European states. With the Europe Program, which turned out to be rather long, we did perhaps to a small extent invite
- the reproach: What you cannot push through in your own country, you have written in for Europe. But there you are dealing with a long-term program.

STERN: After the Europe election next year, only 16 months remain until the next Bundestag election. Are you afraid that at that time Franz Josef Strauss will enter the scene with a federation-wide CSU, the fourth party?

- Brandt: What do you mean by being afraid? I don't believe that the fortune and misfortune of the Federal Republic depends on whether Franz Josef Strauss
- will come up with his own party. I don't want a repeat of Weimar, but separatist developments to the right of center should not be viewed as being tantamount to the end of the world.

STERN: And separatist developments in your own party?

Brandt: Splits have never been good for social democracy. That is spoken by someone who himself in 1931 as a very young man took part in one. But there, too, I cannot speak for eternity.

STERN: Still prior to the Europe and Bundestag election, the Union is intent upon getting Karl Carstens' elected as president of the Federal Republic, although he possibly lied before the Guillaume committee in 1974 concerning the participation of the Federal Information Service [BND] in the weapons trade.

Brandt: I don't want to make a statement about this now. However, I am interested in making it clear that the report of the president of the BND mentioned in the press, which the latter supposedly submitted during my chancellorship, was never brought to my attention--which was not required. Regardless of whether, in the question which you have raised, there will be reason to reproach Mr Carstens, I stand by what I said in the spring: The parties should agree on the re-election of Walter Scheel.

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WEST GERMANY

NORDIC COUNTRIES DIVIDED IN REACTION TO MONETARY SYSTEM

Frankfurt am/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Dec 78 p 11

[Article by Adam Von Werner: "Scandinavia Bides Its Time"]

[Text] The north is showing its cool side. The active efforts in particular to create a monetary link between the EEC and the Scandinavian countries have remained without response. The fact that the architects of the European monetary system received rejections in their first attempts with Norway as well as Sweden does not mean a refusal to join the new federation, however. On the contrary. First, to quote Norwegian Prime Minister Nordli, all Nordic countries have basically "positive expectations" of the system. Second, the chances for success of the search for a more stable monetary order are seen as being better after Italy and Ireland joined following an initial hesitation than they were immediately after the Brussels resolution; and third, the governments and banks in Oslo and Stockholm want to change their minds on their present position of remaining on the sidelines at the latest when Britain should change its position.

Nevertheless both countries belonged to the old monetary "snake"--Sweden until one and a half years ago and Norway until a few days ago. In addition it has been seen repeatedly that the economic effects within the EEC do not only touch the Nordic countries tangentially but influence them directly. But as free of political aspects as the Brussels start may be in its own sphere, the starting positions of the individual Scandinavian countries are very varied at the same time. Surely, they are making serious and not unsuccessful efforts within the framework of the Nordic Council formed by them to make full use of the present possibilities of coordinating their economic, financial and social policies. There are limits to this institutionalization of cooperation simply by the fact that Denmark and Norway have closely allied themselves with the west in their foreign and defense policies but that Sweden and Finland insist on a real or imagined neutrality.

Denmark belongs both to NATO and to the EEC. Although strong domestic controversies preceded its entry into the EEC in 1973, there is now no serious politician in this country who regrets that step or would like to reverse it. It is freely agreed that the linkage with the EEC was a blessing not only for the Danish agricultural sector but has been good for the national economy as a whole. Today Denmark can be counted as one of the

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most loyal members of the EEC. In the course of discussions about the new monetary system the wish was expressed more clearly than ever in Copenhagen to form something like a hinge between Western and Northern Europe.

The fact that Norway, which is part of NATO like Denmark, was not also able to come aboard the EEC 5 years ago was on the one hand due to the political and tactical clumsiness of its proponents. On the other hand, there was a "green front" recruited from the important group--numerically if for no other reason--of fishermen. But especially these people have not seen anything to oppose their opinions. In view of a fishing policy of the EEC that is depressing not only from their perspective, they find the EEC as unattractive as before and let themselves be led readily by those political forces which are attempting to use the question of the monetary system again as a campaign against the EEC itself.

At any rate Social-Democratic Prime Minister Nordli, who has only a minority government, did not think he could risk a renewed conflict about the EEC. He had hoped at first that he would be able to use the much less controversial membership of his country in the monetary "snake" to direct Norway quietly into the new federation by means of this "vehicle." But Nordli did not get the desired help even from the Central Bank Council because the majority of this board was of the opinion that as long as Great Britain and Sweden as important trade partners of Norway did not become more favorably disposed toward the European monetary system it would be wiser to regulate the value of their currency themselves.

This is just what Sweden decided in August 1977 when it left the "snake" after two depreciations totaling 18 percent, arguing that a stimulation of exports that were then very depressed needed a stronger exchange currency flexibility than could be offered by a European monetary regulation dominated by the "hard D-Mark." Against the protest of the Social-Democrats who just a year ago had to resort to the opposition bank the bourgeois coalition government of Prime Minister Faelldin, who as the representative of the interests of Swedish farmers was not very open to Europe, reached for a monetary system that actually gave the country a relatively stable currency and above all a notable export surplus. Of course this was even more the result of a savings policy that was begun simultaneously, an austerity program which is meanwhile being practiced as decisively in Norway.

Finland which has almost all the same economic problems as its neighboring Scandinavian countries is an exception against its will because it has to take the Soviet Union into consideration. As early as the early 70's when Helsinki reached a free-trade agreement with the EEC with great effort, the Moscow oriented communists screamed murder. No, Finland cannot even consider for the present time joining the European monetary system. It can only hope--that much was said publicly by Sorsa, the Social-Democratic government leader--that the new European monetary concept would have indirect advantages for it.

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But there is no doubt of the basic positive attitude of all Scandinavian countries toward the European monetary system. Since, excepting Denmark, they do not belong to the EEC they know that they, unlike some EEC members, would not have direct advantages from joining the monetary federation. Still, Norway and Sweden calculating sharply have asked for time to think this over without taking offense, as others for example, at the German driving force. It cannot be judged as indecisiveness or opportunism that Oslo and Stockholm first want to see the results.

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